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Abstract
This paper uses microdata to evaluate the impact of an increase in maximum benet
duration on the steady-state unemployment rate. We draw on policy changes in
Austria that extended maximum benet duration from 30 to 52 weeks for individuals
above age 50 and from 30 to 39 weeks for individuals between ages 40 and 49. We
use these changes to estimate the causal impact of benet duration on labor market
ows and nd that (i) the policy changes lead to an increase in the steady-state
unemployment rate between 20 % and 50 %; (ii) surprisingly, most of the increase
is due to an increase in the inow into unemployment, whereas the decrease in the
outow from unemployment is modest; (iii) the e¤ects are stronger for women than
for men, but are otherwise rather robust across population subgroups.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to assess how the potential duration of unemployment benet
a¤ects the equilibrium unemployment rate. Our main contribution is the analysis of the
joint e¤ects of benet duraton on the outow from and the inow into unemployment.
This is di¤erent from the literature which has studied one of these two e¤ects in isolation.
The majority of previous studies has concentrated on the e¤ects of the generosity of
the benet system on the probability that unemployed workers nd regular jobs while
a smaller literature has looked on the role of benet rules on the probability to enter
unemployment.
According to standard job search theory, more generous unemployment benets in-
crease the unemployment rate by reducing the search e¤ort of workers thereby reducing
the unemployment outow rate. This prediction has been studied extensively in theo-
retical and empirical work and has proved to be empirically relevant and quantitatively
important. The general nding from the empirical literature which will be discussed in
more detail below is that it takes about 14 weeks of benet duration to increase unem-
ployment duration by one week.
The benet system may a¤ect unemployment not only via a reduced outow from
unemployment but also via a higher inow into unemployment. One prominent argu-
ment, due to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), holds that idiosyncratic shocks to workers
productivities let rmsoptimal layo¤ rule depend on the wage rate which in turn is
a¤ected by the prevailing unemployment benet system. If the benet system becomes
more generous newly established jobs become unprotable more quickly. As a result, a
more generous benet system will lead to an increase in the steady state ow from em-
ployment to unemployment. Alternatively, when workerspreferences (rather than their
productivity) change randomly over time, a su¢ ciently negative shock may induce an
employed worker to "quit" and collect benets. More generous benets will induce indi-
viduals to quit more easily rasing the inow into unemployment. As we discuss below,
and in contrast to outow e¤ects, empirical evidence on the e¤ects of benet e¤ects on
the unemployment inow is much more scarce and far from conclusive.
Our analysis is based on a change in the Austrian unemployment insurance system
that lead to a quasi-experimental situation allowing us to estimate benet-duration ef-
fects on ows in and out of unemployment. In August 1989, the Austrian government
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made unemployment insurance more generous by increasing the maximum duration of
unemployment benets for certain groups of workers. Depending on age and previous
work experience, the potential duration of regular benets was raised from 30 to 52 weeks
for one group, from 30 to 39 for a second group, and remained unchanged for a further
group. We exploit this policy change and its di¤erential treatment of these various groups
of workers to assess the impact of benet duration on unemployment inows and outows.
A particular advantage of our analysis is a very large and informative data drawn
from two sources: the Austrian unemployment register and the Austrian Social Security
Data (ASSD). These data sources contain the universe of all employed and unemployed
Austrian workers. We observe these worker over a period of four years, two years before
the policy change, i.e. from August 1987 to July 1989; and two years after this policy
change, from August 1989 to July 1991. A further advantage of our study concerns the
fact that the period during which the policy change took place was quite stable from a
macroeconomic environment. This implies that our study is not subject to the endogenous
policy which arises when more generous unemployment insurance rules are implemented in
anticipation of a deteriorating labor market. Such a policy bias has been found important
in several recent studies (Card and Levine, 2000, Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004a). The
absence of an endogenous policy bias, the large size and the low measurement error in
our data set allow us to estimate the relevant policy parameters quite precisely.
Understanding the inow and outow e¤ects of the unemployment benet system is
crucial for labor market policy. First, the overall e¤ect of a policy change remains unclear
without a comprehensive understanding of both the inow and the outow channel. The
risk is that policy makers may underestimate the implications of extended benets for
steady state labor market outcomes. Second, it is also crucial to understand the relative
importance of the inow and the outow channel from a welfare point of view. Generous
benets that prolong unemployment spells can be problematic because long-term unem-
ployment can cause skill depreciation. Skill depreciation is less of a concern when generous
benets mainly reduce job duration. As previous studies were typically concerned either
with the inow e¤ect or with the outow e¤ect, the relative size of these two e¤ects re-
mains unclear. The current study aims to shed light on their relative importance. As far
as we know, this is the rst paper that investigates the implications of the unemployment
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benet system from a comprehensive perspective.1
The set-up of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we review the relevant theoretical and
empirical literature. Section 3 discusses the characteristics of the Austrian unemployment
insurance system and briey describes the Austrian labor market during the period when
the change in maximum unemployment benets was implemented. Section 4 presents
the data we use in our analysis and discusses our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents
parameter estimates and section 6 uses our estimates to simulate the implied e¤ects for
the steady-state unemployment rate. Section 7 concludes.
2 How potential benet duration a¤ects unemploy-
ment
2.1 Theory
Denote by u;t(xjT ) the probability that an unemployed worker with personal character-
istics x nds a job in calendar time interval t when T is the maximum benet duration
(or potential benet duration PBD); and by e;t(xjT ) the probability that an employed
worker with these characteristics looses his/her job in calendar time interval t. The steady
state unemployment rate of the group of workers with characteristics x is then
u(xjT ) = e(xjT )
e(xjT ) + u(xjT )
: (1)
Consider the e¤ects of a change in the maximum benet duration T from the perspec-
tive of search theory. According to Mortensen (1977) expanding the duration of benets
has two opposite e¤ects on the exit rate out of unemployment. First, the value of being
unemployed increases so there is a disincentive e¤ect that leads an unemployment worker
to search less intensively. Second, the value of being employed also increases (because
the value of being unemployed in the future has increased) which has a positive e¤ect
on the exit rate. For short-term unemployed the disincentive e¤ect dominates, for unem-
ployed near the point of benet exhaustion (and beyond) the incentive e¤ect dominates.
1There are cross-country studies that relate aggregate parameters of the unemployment insurance
system - i.e. average replacement rate and average benet duration - and other labor market institutions
in various countries to the aggregate unemployment rates in these countries. See for an overview Layard
and Nickell (1999).
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Therefore, if there is an extension of benet duration this will have a negative e¤ect on
the exit rate out of unemployment for short-term unemployed but it will have a positive
e¤ect on the exit rate for long-term unemployed. While rst e¤ect has been found often
in empirical research, evidence for the second e¤ect is scarce (Fredriksson and Holmlund,
2003).
The increase in the value of being unemployed through the extension of the potential
benet duration may also induce an increase in the inow into unemployment. There
are various reasons why this could be the case. For instance, the standard search and
matching model with endogenous job destruction (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, and
Pissarides, 2000, chapter 2) assumes that a workers productivity on the job is subject
to idiosyncratic shocks and rms require a minimum productivity level that prevents
them from ring the worker and destroying the job. The rmsreservation productivity
increases with more generous unemployment benets, because more generous benets
push up wages requiring a higher average productivity on the job. Alternatively, assume
a workers disutility of labor (rather than his/her productivity) is subject to idiosyncratic
shocks. In that case, more generous benets will induce a worker to quit his/her job
more easily. A more generous unemployment benets may also increase the take-up of
unemployment benets. Conditional on loosing his/her job, a worker may be more inclined
to apply for a benet. Finally, it may be that the separation rate increases because a
worker reduces his/her e¤ort on the job and is more likely to be dismissed because he/she
is less likely to take actions to prevent job loss.2
In conclusion, from a theoretical point of view, it is likely that @u(xjT )=@T < 0 and
@e(xjT )=@T > 0. Therefore, an extension of the maximum benet duration will increase




2Note, however, that according to Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003) there is not much empirical
evidence in support of such an e¤ect.
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2.2 Empirical literature
Several US studies estimate the e¤ects on the unemployment exit rate of variations in
PBD that take place during recessions.3 Early studies, including Mo¢ tt and Nicholson
(1982), Mo¢ tt (1985), and Grossman (1989) nd signicantly negative incentive e¤ects.
Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990) show that the exit rate from unemployment
rises sharply just before benets are exhausted. Such spikes are absent for nonrecipients.
More recent work by Addison and Portugal (2004) conrms these ndings.4
A common objection against these studies is policy endogeneity. Benets are typically
extended in anticipation of a worse labor market for the eligible workers. Card and Levine
(2000) exploit a variation in benet duration that occurred independently of labor market
condition and show that policy bias is substantial. Lalive and Zweimüller (2004b) nd
similar evidence for Austria.
Evidence on the e¤ect of PBD in European studies is mixed. Hunt (1995) nds sub-
stantial disincentive e¤ects of extended benet entitlement periods for Germany. Carling,
Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1996) nd a big increase in the outow from unemploy-
ment to labor market programs whereas the increase in the exit rate to employment is
substantially smaller. Puhani (2000) nds that reductions in PBD in Poland did not
have a signicant e¤ect on the duration of unemployment whereas Adamchik (1999) nds
a strong increase in re-employment probabilities around benet expiration. Roed and
Zhang (2003) nd for Norwegian unemployed that the exit rate out of unemployment in-
creases sharply in the months just prior to benet exhaustion where the e¤ect is larger for
females than for males. Winter-Ebmer (1998) and Lalive and Zweimüller (2004b) show
that extending the potential duration of benets had signicant disincentive e¤ects in
Austria. Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) studying PBD reductions in Slovenia nd both
strong e¤ects on the exit rate out of unemployment and substantial spikes around benet
3Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003) give a recent overview of empirical research related to incentives
in unemployment insurance. See Green and Riddell (1993, 1997), and Ham and Rea (1987) for studies
that focus on Canada.
4Note that there is no theoretical explanation for the existence of end-of-benet spikes. It could be
that the spikes have to do with strategic timing of the job starting date, i.e. workers have already found
a job but they postpone starting to work until their benets are close to expiration. Card and Levine
(2000) point at the possibility that there is an implicit contract between the unemployed worker and his
previous employer to be rehired just before benet expire.
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exhaustion.
Empirical studies on the unemployment inow e¤ect of a lengthening of the maximum
benet duration are more rare. Most of these studies focus on requirements concerning en-
trance into unemployment insurance. Christodes and McKenna (1995, 1996) for example
nd a clear relationship between entrance requirements of Canadian UI and employment
durations. The exit rate from employment to unemployment increases substantially as
soon as the workers satisfy the number of weeks worked in order to qualify for UI ben-
ets. Anderson and Meyer (1997) investigate the take up rate of unemployment benet
insurance of workers separating from their employer. They nd that both the level and
the maximum duration of benets have a signicant positive e¤ect. Green and Riddell
(1997) study the e¤ect of changes on entrance requirements on the inow into Canadian
unemployment nding that changes in entrance requirements have a signicant impact
on employment durations. They also nd that many employment spells that just qualify
under the old system are extended to just qualify under the new system. And they nd
that all of the response is in layo¤s, not quits, which suggest that employers play an
important role in the adjustment of employment durations. Green and Sargent (1998)
analyze Canadian data and also nd evidence of concentrations of job spell durations at
the entrance requirement point and at the point at which individuals have qualied for
the maximum possible weeks of UI receipts. Winter-Ebmer (2003) nds strong inow ef-
fects of the Austrian regional extended benet program which granted very long benets
for older wokers in certain regions.5 These results are in line with those of Lalive and
Zweimüller (2004a) who also nd signcant inow e¤ects which were particularly strong
immediately before this program was abolished.
5The regional extended benet program was implemented in 1987 and ended in 1993 and was directed
to a subset of Austrian regions. (See Winter-Ebmer, 1998, 2002 and Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004a,
2004b). The policy change analyzed here applies to workers in all other regions and excludes regions that
were subject to the regional extended benet program.
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3 The labor market in Austria
3.1 Unemployment benets
Like in a number of other countries the Austrian unemployment insurance system is
characterized by a limited period over which unemployed individuals can draw regu-
larunemployment benets (UB). Unemployment benets depend on previous earnings
and, compared to other European countries, the replacement ratio (UB relative to gross
monthly earnings) is rather low. In 1990, the replacement ratio was 40.4 % for the median
income earner; 48.2 % for a low-wage worker who earned half the median; and 29.6 % for
a high-wage worker earning twice the median. On top, family allowances are paid. UB
payments are not taxed and not means-tested. Voluntary quitters and workers discharged
for misconduct cannot claim benets until a waiting period of 4 weeks has passed. UB
recipients are expected to search actively for a new job that should be within the scope of
the claimants qualications, at least during the rst months of the unemployment spell.
Non-compliance with the eligibility rules is subject to benet sanctions that can lead to
the withdrawal of benets for up to 4 weeks.
Once the period of regular unemployment benets has expired, individuals can apply
for transfer payments for those in need".6 As the name indicates, these transfers are
means-tested and the job seeker is considered eligible only if she or he is in trouble.
These payments depend on the income and wealth situation of other family members and
close relatives and may, in principle, last for an indenite time period. These transfers
are granted for successive periods of 39 weeks after which eligibility requirements are
recurrently checked. The post-UB transfers are lower than UB and can at most be 92 %
of UB. In 1990, the median post-UB transfer payment was about 70 % of the median UB.
Note however, that individuals who are eligible for such transfers may not be comparable
to individuals who collect UB because not all individuals who exhaust UB pass the means
test. The majority of the unemployed (59 %) received UB whereas 26 % received post-
UB transfers. In sum, the Austrian unemployment insurance system is less generous than
many other continental European systems and closer to the U.S. system.7
6This so-called Notstandshilfe" implies that job seekers who do not meet UB eligibility criteria can
apply at the beginning of their spell.
7See Nickell and Layard (1999). It is interesting to note that the incidence of long-term unemployment
in Austria is closer to U.S. gures than to those of other European countries. In 1995, when our sample
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Before August 1989, an unemployed person could draw regular unemployment benets
(UB) for a maximum period of 30 weeks provided that he or she had paid unemployment
insurance contributions for at least 156 weeks within the last 5 years.8 In August 1989 the
potential duration of UB payments became dependent not only on previous experience
but also on age at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Benet duration for the age
group 40-49 was increased to 39 weeks if the unemployed had been employed 312 weeks
of employment within the last 10 years prior to the current spell. For the age group 50
and older, UB-duration was increased to 52 weeks if the unemployed had been employed
for at least 468 weeks within the last 15 years.
3.2 The labor market 1987-1992
Before we go into the details of data and statistical analysis, it is instructive to briey
review the situation on the Austrian labor market during the period 1987 to 1992. This
is the period on which the empirical analysis below will be concentrated. In 1987 the
economy was at the end of a recession and started to improve. Real GDP growth was
1.7 % in 1987 and then started to grow to as much as 4.7 % in 1990. The favorable
situation of the business cycle lead to strong employment growth throughout the period
under consideration. The unemployment rate was rather stable over this period due to
an increase in labor supply (immigration and rising female labor force participation).
Aggregate ows into and out of unemployment did not dramatically change during the
period under consideration. The aggregate quarterly unemployment inow rate (new un-
employment spells that started in given quarter relative to the total stock of employment
and out-of-labor-force) was uctuating around 2.75 percent and the average duration of
unemployment (spells completed during respective year) was roughly stable at somewhat
less than 4 months. The average unemployment rate during the post-treatment period
1989-1991 was as high as during the pre-treatment period 1987-1988. Furthermore, em-
ployment growth during the treatment period was even somewhat stronger than before.
It is worth noting that this situation is favorable in terms for our empirical strategy.
period ends, 17.4 % of the unemployment stock were spells with an elapsed duration of 12 months or
more. This compares to 9.7 % for the U.S. and to 45.6 % for France, 48.3 % for Germany, and 62.7 %
for Italy (OECD, 1995).
8UB duration was 20 weeks for job-seekers who did not meet this requirement. This paper focuses on
individuals who were entitled to at least 30 weeks of benets.
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It is unlikely that our results from a comparison of the labor market experiences of older
workers before and after the policy change are driven by a deteriorating labor market.
As the state of the business cycle does not di¤er much between the two periods, an in-
creased unemployment inow and/or longer durations of unemployment for the subgroup
of workers eligible to longer PBD can be attributed to more generous benets.
4 Data and Empirical Strategy
To assess the impact of the above increase in benet duration on unemployment outow
and inow rates, we use longitudinal individual data from two di¤erent sources: (i) the
Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD) which contains detailed information on the
individualsemployment, unemployment and earnings history since the year 1972, and
some information on the employer like region and industry a¢ liation; and (ii) the Austrian
unemployment register from which we get information on the relevant socio-economic
characteristics.
From these data we drew two samples, a before-policy" sample and an after-policy"
sample, as follows. For both samples we selected individuals who were at least 35 years
and at most 54 years old. Furthermore, we included only individuals with a continuous
work history. To be included in the sample, an individual had to have a job for at
least 6 out of the last 10 years and for at least 9 out of the last 15 years. Hence all
individuals in our sample satisfy the work experience criteria for eligibility to extended
benet duration (see above). Furthermore, we excluded all individuals living in regions
subject to the regional extended benet program.9 Furthermore, we considered only
workers with previous income above ATS 12,610 (Euros 916). Workers above this income
threshold experienced an increase in maximum benet duration but no further change in
the benet rules. For workers below this threshold, the 1989 policy change also raised
benets levels. The analysis here is conned to an evaluation of maximum benet duration
on the level of unemployment rate. Restricting the analysis to higher-earnings workers
avoids confounding benet level e¤ects with maximum benet duration e¤ects.
9The so-called Krisenregionsregelung" accounted for about 15 % of all observations. In these crises-
ridden regions even more generous unemployed insurance policies were implemented between 1988 and
1993. For empirical analyses of these programmes, see Winter-Ebmer (1998 and 2003) and Lalive and
Zweimüller (2002, 2004).
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For the "before-policy" sample we selected all individuals who were either (i) employed
as white or blue collar workers or who were (ii) unemployed at one of the four mid-quarter
baseline dates (10th February, 10th May, 10th August, 10th October) in the year 1986.
We then follow these individuals up until quarter IV.1988. Similarly, the "after-policy"
sample contains all individuals who were either unemployed or employed as blue- or white-
collar workers at each mid-quarter baseline date in the year 1990. We then follow these
individuals up until quarter IV.1992. Note that this design allows individuals in the before-
policy (after-policy) sample to be out of labor force only in the years 1987 and 1988 (1991
and 1992). Hence this restriction reinforces our focus on attached workers. Note further,
that we do not consider observations for the year 1989. This procedure minimizes potential
biases resulting from anticipation e¤ects that may arise due to behavioral changes of
individuals that were unemployed under initial policy rules but were anticipating that
rules will become more generous.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Table 1 compares the characteristics of the two groups. There are basically two major
di¤erences between the two groups. First, we see that after the policy change, somewhat
more than a quarter (half) of the sample is eligible to additional 22 (9) weeks of potential
benets duration. While average age in the before-policy sample is only slightly younger
(by 0.4 years) than the after-policy sample, the distribution across relevant age groups is
more strongly a¤ected. Second we see that the after-policy sample has a higher fraction
of females.10 Otherwise, the di¤erences between sample are minor. Real earnings are
slightly higher in the after-policy sample. Also the years of work experience within the
last 15 years ("Experience") and the duration of the current job ("Tenure"; for the non-
employed: tenure in the last job) is slightly higher in the after policy sample. Moreover,
the number of white collar workers and the industry distributions of the two samples are
very similar.
10The higher fraction of ages 50+ is because the big birth cohorts of 1940 - 1942 are in the age group
40-49 in the before-policy sample whereas they are in the age group 50+ in the after-policy sample. The
higher fraction of females in the after-policy sample is most likely due to the fact that the cohorts that
are in the after-policy but not in the before-policy sample have a high labor force participation and are
relatively large (vintages in the mid 1950s). In contrast, the cohorts that are in the before-policy sample
but not in the after-policy sample (vintages of the early 1930s) do have a low labor force participation
and are comparably small.
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Our analysis of the impact of the maximum duration of benets on the steady-state
unemployment rate is based on an analysis of individual transition probabilities to and
from unemployment. To assess the e¤ect of the maximum benet duration on these
transition probabilities we use a simple di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator in the context
of a probit model for quarterly transition probabilities for observation i in quarter t
yit = y1ELIG52it + y2ELIG39it + yAit + xity + "yit (3)
yit  0 if yit = 1 and yit < 0 if yit = 0
where y is a subscript indicating whether the transition concerns outow from unem-
ployment (y = u) or inow into unemployment (y = e). The variables ELIG52it and
ELIG39it are indicator variables that take value 1 when observation i is eligible for at
most 52 or at most 39 benet weeks, respectively.11 Furthermore, y1 and y2 are the
corresponding di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimators, the dummy variable Ait indicates the
after-policy period and y measures the calender time e¤ect on transition y that is irre-
spective of observation is eligibility status. Finally, xit is a vector in individual charac-
teristics, y is a vector of parameters that estimate the impact of these characteristics on
transition y,12 and the error term "yit capturing unobservable heterogeneity are assumed
to be standard normally distributed.13
Obviously, whether the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator identies the causal e¤ect
of the increase in benet duration on the unemployment risk hinges upon whether or
not the policy change was exogenous.14 There are two reasons why policy endogeneity
is most likely of minor importance in the present context. The rst reason is that the
economy was doing badly before the policy change (in the years 1987 and 1988). After
the policy change (in the years 1989, 1990, 1991) the economy was in a boom. To the
extent that all age groups were benetting from this situation, policy endogeneity is not
11All observations in our samples for which both T39i = 0 and T52i = 0 are eligible for at most 30
weeks of benets.
12The vector of individual characteristics include the individuals age, an age spline, dummies for the
inow quarter, log daily wage, experience, tenure, broad occupation (blue/white collar), sex, and industry
(manufacturing, construction/tourism, other industries).
13The analysis below will be undertaken also for more exible specications of age and calendar time,
and will be estimated for various subgroups to assess the robustness of the results.
14If policy was implemented because policy makers became concerned with worse labor market
prospects for older individuals there would be policy endogeneity.
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an issue. Second, one reason for the implementation of the policy may have been equity
concerns. In 1988, the Austrian government implemented a very generous program that
was targeted towards older steel in crises ridden steel regions. This Austrian regional
extended benet program granted 4 years of unemployment benets to eligible older
workers in crisis-ridden steel regions. Hence political pressure to treat older unemployed
workers in non-eligible regions more generously was one reason for changing the benet
rules. To the extent that such equity concerns were the reason for the policy change, the
increase in benet duration can be regarded as exogenous with respect to labor market
outcomes of the eligible individuals in our sample.
5 Empirical estimates
We proceed in two steps. We rst show the regression results of our basic statistical
model for the unemployment ows, separately for the unemployment outow and the un-
employment inow. We next check (i) whether our estimated e¤ects of benet duration
extension are robust to at a more exible specication of the age and calendar time vari-
ables; and (ii) how the estimated e¤ects di¤er across various population subgroups. Using
our outow- and inow-estimates, we can then discuss the question of our main interest:
How do the changes in maximum benet duration a¤ect the steady-state unemployment
rate? This is done in the next Section below.
5.1 Unemployment outow and inow
Table 2 show the results of equation (3) both for the unemployment outow (column
1) and the unemployment inow (column 2). (Notice that the coe¢ cients displayed in
the Table are probit-coe¢ cients rather than marginal e¤ects). The probit estimation of
column 1 includes all 44,909 unemployment cases in our sample that are observed in one
of the eight quarterly baseline dates. Similarly, the estimation of column 2 is based on
the 1,433,259 employment cases observed in our sample.
The di¤-in-di¤ estimators are in line with the theoretical predictions. Eligibility to
longer benets reduces the outow rate from unemployment (column 1) and increases the
inow probability into unemployment (column 2). All coe¢ cients have the expected sign.
The e¤ect of increasing PBD by 22 weeks (ELIG52) is particularly strong, both in the
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outow and in the inow equation. The e¤ect of increasing PBD by 9 weeks (ELIG39)
is weaker and statistically signicant only in the inow equation.
To translate the probit-coe¢ cents of Table 2 into changes in in- and outow probabil-
ities, we evaluate the coe¢ cients at the sample mean of the outow rate (= :586) and the
inow rate (= :0175): The ELIG52-coe¢ cient of  :183 in the outow equation implies
that the extending the maximum duration of benets from 30 to 52 weeks decreases the
quarterly outow rate by about 7 percentage points.
Table 2: E¤ect of PBD-increase on unemployment-outow and -inow
We nd a strong impact of extending the maximum benet duration on the unem-
ployment inow. The e¤ects are not only highly signicant, they are also quantitatively
substantial. Evaluated at the sample mean of the outow rate (= :0175) the ELIG52
probit-coe¢ cient of +:143 implies that, as a result of an increase in maximum benet
duration from 30 to 52 weeks, the monthly inow rate increases by :50 percentage points.
Similarly, the ELIG39-coe¢ cient of +:054 implies a corresponding increase of :18 per-
centage points in the quarterly inow rate.15
Table 2 also displays the coe¢ cient for the control variables included in the regres-
sions. The results indicate that age has a negative (but barely signicant) impact on the
probability to exit unemployment, and a signicantly positive impact on the probability
to enter unemployment. Apart from the continuous e¤ect of age (in years), there is no
signicant additional impact of age for the eligibility-relevant age bracket 40-49.16 The
coe¢ cient for "Age Spline 40" implies that the age-e¤ect for individuals below age 40
and in the age group 40-49 is not signicantly di¤erent, both in the outow- and the
inow-regressions. However, we nd that an additional year of age beyond age 50 ("Age
15With respect to the e¤ect of PBD on the unemployment outow, our results are in line with the
estimates in Lalive et al. (2006) who nd that the increase in PBD from 30 to 52 weeks lead to an
increase in the expected duration of unemployment of 12.3 percent and who nd a very small e¤ect of the
increase in PBD from 30 to 39 weeks. Our results are also similar to previous estimate to Winter-Ebmer
(2003) who nds substantial e¤ects of PBD on the unemployment inow for a di¤erent policy change in
Austria, which extended PBD for older worker in certain regions.
16The regression of Table 2 assumes a piecewise linear e¤ect of age on the probit index 1  age+ 2 
(age  40)  I(age  40) + 2  (age  50)  I(age  50); where I(age  x) indicates whether is of age x
or older. The variable Age Spline 40 is given by (age  40)  I(age  40) and the variable Age Spline 50
is given by (age  50)  I(age  50):
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Spline 50") strongly a¤ects the outow from (but not the inow into) unemployment.
This may be a result of social security legislation that makes access to early retirement
benets more generous for individuals beyond age 50.
Similarly, we do not nd signicant of calendar time e¤ects (as indicated by coe¢ cient
of the after-policy dummy), both in the outow- and in the inow-regression. This con-
rms our assumption that labor market conditions have not been worse after the policy-
change than before. Furthermore, our estimates indicate substantial seasonal uctuations
both in inow and outow rates. We also nd that high-wage workers have substantially
lower turnover: not only is their risk of unemployment is lower, but high-wage workers
have also lower chances to exit unemployment. Similar e¤ects are found with respect to
pervious work experience and tenure in the previous job. In contrast, white-collar workers
have both a higher exit rate and a lower unemployment entry rate. Results also show
signicant di¤erences between industries with, unsurprisingly, turnover being higher in
seasonal industries (construction, tourism) and somewhat higher in manufacturing than
in other industries (the reference category). Finally, we nd that women have signicantly
worse chances than men to exit unemployment. Furthermore, there are signicant gender
di¤erences in the risk of unemployment.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
We now check the sensitivity of our parameter estimates. We look rst for a more exible
specication of age and/or calendar time (Table 3). This could be important, as the di¤-
in-di¤ coe¢ cient that identies the e¤ect of the increase in maximum benet duration, is
based on interactions with age brackets 50+ and 40-49, respectively, as well as on calendar
time. Hence appropriate control for age and calendar time e¤ects seems crucial.
Table 3: More exible e¤ect of age and calendar time
The results reported in Table 3 indicate that the estimated e¤ects are quite robust with
respect to a more exible specications of age and calendar time. The results reported
in the rst column control for the particular calendar time quarter (rather than a single
after-policy dummy and seasonal quarter-dummies as in Table 2). Results in the second
column are based on a regression that accounts for single-year age dummies (rather than
the piecewise linear age e¤ects captured by the age and age-spline variables in Table
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2). Column 3 contains the most exible specication with both quarterly calendar time
dummies and single-year age-dummies. In all cases, the point estimates are quite similar
to the one obtained in Table 2 above. Furthermore, ELIG52-coe¢ cients are all highly
signicant and the point estimates are very close to the ones obtained in Table 2. Similarly,
just like in Table 2, the ELIG39-coe¢ cients are statistically signicant only in the inow-
but not in the outow-regression. Again, the point estimates are very similar. Hence we
conclude that our results are rather robust with respect to the particular specication of
age and calendar time.
As a further test for the robustness of our results, we look at the e¤ects of the change
in maximum benet duration once we split our sample into various subgroups (Table 4).
As a general picture, Table 4 reveals that increasing the maximum benet duration from
30 to 52 weeks signicantly a¤ects both the outow from (column 1) and the ow into un-
employment (column 3) in most subgroups. In contrast, increasing the maximum benet
duration from 30 to 39 weeks, yields insignicant e¤ects on the unemployment outow in
all subgroups (except for men), but still highly signicant e¤ects on the unemployment
inow for all groups.
Table 4: Probit-results for various subgroups
Furthermore, the results in Table 4 show that the e¤ects are heterogenous across
subgroups. For instance, labor market ows of women are more strongly a¤ected by the
increase in maximum benet duration from 30 to 52 weeks. Interestingly, the opposite
is the case for the increase from 30 to 39 weeks. The large increase a¤ects the outow
rates of blue-collars more strongly than those of white-collars. However, the opposite is
true with respect to the unemployment inow. A similar picture emerges when we split
the sample, respectively, into low- and high-wage workers and into low- and high-tenure
workers. Finally, and in line with expectations, non-seasonal workers are more strongly
a¤ected by the policy changes, while only weak e¤ects are detected for high-turnover
seasonal workers.
6 Benet duration and equilibrium unemployment
Using the parameter estimates of the inow and outow probabilities we consider how the
maximum benet duration a¤ects equilibrium unemployment. Our thought experiment is
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the following. Let us take our estimates of the increase in PBD at face value and consider
a steady-state situation in which the inow into and the outow from are identical. Which
unemployment rate is implied by the system before the policy change as compared to the
system after the change. Ignoring e¤ects of personal characteristics x we have
u(T ) =
̂e(T )
̂e(T ) + ̂u(T )
(4)
The policy changes we are analyzing are discrete, and amount to a substantial increase
in maximum benet duration for the concerned groups. In order to assess the e¤ect of
the change in benet duration on equilibrium unemployment, we perform a comparative
static analysis. If T1 and T2 are the maximum benet durations before and after the
policy change, the change in equilibrium unemployment equals
u = u(T2)  u(T1) (5)
Furthermore, it is straightforward to decompose this change into (i) a change due to a
lower outow from unemployment, (ii) a change due to a higher inow into unemployment,
and (iii) to an interaction e¤ect involving higher-order terms
u = u(out) + u(in) + interaction e¤ect











We are now ready to present our simulation results that show how the more generous
potential benet duration a¤ects the steady-state unemployment rate (Table 5). We
proceed as follows. To get the e¤ect of the benet duration increase from 30 to 52
weeks, we utilize the entire sample (all age groups, both before- and after-policy sample).
Using our regression results of Table 2 we estimate, for each observation, the inow-
17Note that the interaction e¤ect captures both changes in ows between employment and non-
employment (which are likely to be negligible) and multiplicative terms of changes in unemployment-
inow and -outow rates that arise due to the discrete nature of our decomposition analysis.
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and outow-probability with and without benet duration extended to 52 weeks. With
these estimates, we can calculate the implied steady-state unemployment rate with and
without extended benet duration. Moreover, using these estimates we can decompose
the estimated increase in the steady-state unemployment rate into an inow- and an
outow-component applying the procedure described. For the PBD extension from 30 to
39 weeks, we proceed in an analogous way.
Table 5 reports the result from this simulation exercise. In the upper panel of Table
5 we show the e¤ects of the PBD extension from 30 to 52 weeks. The exit rate from
unemployment (rst column) falls from :5369 before the policy change and to :4768 after
the change, implying a 11:2% reduction in the unemployment outow probability. Sim-
ilarly, the entry rate into unemployment (second column) increases from :0157 to :0209,
which amounts to a 33:4% increase in the unemployment inow probability. Taken to-
gether, these estimates imply an increase in the steady-state unemployment-population
ratio from 2:84 % before the policy change to 4:20 % after the policy change. In other
words, the unemployment rate increases by 1:07 percentage points or by almost 50 %.
Table 5: E¤ects of PBD increase on inow to and outow from unemployment and on
the equilibrium unemployment rate
The lower panel of Table 5 applies the same procedure the estimate the e¤ects of the
PBD extension from 30 to 39 weeks. While qualitatively all e¤ects go in the same direction
they are quantitatively much smaller. The outow probability decreases from :5809 to
:5695; and the inow probability increases from :0161 to :0180: These e¤ects imply an
increase in the equilibrium unemployment ratio of 0:4 percentage points (or 13:8%), from
2:7 percent before the change to 3:1 percent after the change.
Table 5 shows a further interesting result. Decomposing the increase in the unem-
ployment ratio into an inow- and an outow-component reveals that the bulk of the
increase is due to the larger unemployment inow rate. The e¤ect of extended PBD on
the unemployment outow is much smaller. For the PBD increase to 52 weeks, 66:7% of
the increase in the unemployment ratio can be attributed to an increase in the entry rate,
whereas only 25:5% is to due a lower exit rate from unemployment. For the PBD increase
from 30 to 39 weeks, an even larger fraction of the increase in the unemployment ratio
(83:8%) is due to the increase in the inow-rate, whereas only 13:5% can be assigned to
the lower unemployment exit probability.
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A further interesting indicator shows that the increase in PBD raises the unemploy-
ment ratio by :062 percentage points per additional PBD week for the extension from
30 to 52 weeks; and by :041 percentage points for the extension from 30 to 39 weeks.
Interestingly, for both policy changes, the estimated e¤ect per additional PBD week at-
tributable to the unemployment inow, is similar for the short (30 to 39) and the long
(30 to 52) PBD increase. The isolated e¤ect of one additional PBD week on the un-
employment inow indicates and increase in the unemployment ratio by :041 percentage
points (increase from 30 to 52 weeks) and by :034 percentage points (increase from 30 to
39 weeks). The e¤ects on the unemployment outow are much smaller. We nd that one
additional PBD-week increases the equilibrium unemployment ratio by :016 percentage
points for the policy change from 30 to 52 weeks, whereas the corresponding estimate for
the policy change from 30 to 52 weeks amounts to only :005 percentage points.
6.1 Simulations for subgroups
We nd that the increase in maximum benet duration increases equilibrium unemploy-
ment, to some extent because the outow from unemployment goes down but mainly
through an increase in the inow into unemployment. To investigate whether this results
also holds for subgroups we use the parameter estimates presented in Table 4 to perform
similar simulations as before, but now separately for each subgroup. Table 6 presents the
simulation results. The upper part presents the results for the PBD change from 30 to
52 weeks, the lower part gives the simulation results for the PBD change from 30 to 39
weeks. For reasons of comparison the rst rows of each part of the table replicates the
main results of Table 5.18
Table 6: E¤ects of PBD increase on inow to and outow from unemployment and on
the equilibrium unemployment rate; various subgroups
As shown the PBD change from 30 to 52 weeks increases equilibrium unemployment for
every subgroup with the increase for women, low wage workers and non-seasonal workers
being larger than for their counterparts. There is hardly any di¤erence between blue
collar and white collar workers and between workers with low tenure and high tenure.
18Note that in the simulations we use all estimated parameters of Table 6 irrespective of whether or
not they are signicantly di¤erent from zero at conventional levels of signicance.
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For every subgroup the contribution to the change in equilibrium unemployment of the
change in inow is larger than that of the change in outow.
Also for the PBD change from 30 to 39 weeks we nd that the increase in equilibrium
unemployment is mostly due to the increase in the inow into unemployment and to a
much smaller extent due to the decrease in the outow from unemployment.
7 Conclusion
According to job search theory an increase in the maximum unemployment benet du-
ration a¤ects the unemployment rate both through a decrease in the outow from un-
employment and through an increase in the inow to unemployment. These theoretical
predications are conrmed by empirical research. However, empirical research has been
on either the outow from unemployment or the inow into unemployment. There are
no studies that investigate both e¤ects simultaneously. So, it is not clear to what extent
e¤ects on inow and outow a¤ect the unemployment rate.
This paper uses microdata to evaluate the impact of an increase in maximum benet
duration on the steady-state unemployment rate distinguishing between these two e¤ects.
We draw on policy changes in Austria that extended maximum benet duration from
30 to 52 (30 to 39) weeks for individuals above age 50 (between ages 40 and 49) with a
continuous work history. We nd that this policy change lead to 50 % increase in the
steady-state unemployment rate for the older age group and a 20 % increase in the steady-
state unemployment rate for the younger age group. Surprisingly, most of the increase in
equilibrium unemployment is due to an increase in the inow into unemployment, whereas
the e¤ect of the decrease in the outow from unemployment is modest. We also nd that
the e¤ects are stronger for women than for men. There may be institutional reasons this
as conditional on age women are closer to (early) retirement, and it is in line with the
general notion the women react more strongly to incentives wage elasticities of labor
supply are larger for women than for men. Otherwise our results are rather robust across
population subgroups.
Our results show that the PBD extension had much bigger e¤ects on the behavior of
individual unemployed workers than it had on individual employed workers. The PBD
extension made it a lot more attractive for unemployed workers to reduce the search
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activities and thus lower their job nding rate. The PBD extension made it only a little
bit more attractive for employed workers to become unemployed. Nevertheless, since there
are many more employed workers that are a¤ected the aggregate unemployment inow
e¤ect is larger than the aggregate unemployment outow e¤ect. It is the sheer mass of
employed workers that cause the inow e¤ect to be larger.
From a policy point of view it is important to know that the inow e¤ect is larger
than the outow e¤ect. Should this not be taken into account the e¤ects of a change in
PBD will be seriously underestimated. The fact that changes in PBD have quite a large
aggregate inow e¤ect also means that PBD could be an instrument to increase the
employment rate. If the PBD is shortened, rms will become more reluctant to destroy
jobs and / or it will be less attractive for workers to quit" into unemployment. We also
note that our results are partly based on older (50+) workers which have low employment
rates in many countries. Taking into account inow e¤ects for these groups seems highly
relevant from a policy perspective.
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mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
ELIG52 0 0 0.310 0.463
ELIG39 0 0 0.537 0.499
Age 50+ 0.249 0.432 0.310 0.463
Age 40-49 0.576 0.494 0.537 0.499
Age 45.473 5.477 45.952 5.436
After-policy 0 0 1 0
1st quarter 0.252 0.434 0.251 0.434
3rd quarter 0.249 0.432 0.249 0.433
4th quarter 0.248 0.432 0.248 0.432
log(wage) 6.559 0.279 6.585 0.300
Experiencea (in years) 14.192 1.306 14.138 1.370
Tenure (in years) 9.566 5.824 10.341 7.137
White collar 0.541 0.498 0.550 0.497
Manufacturing 0.357 0.479 0.332 0.471
Construction, toursim 0.139 0.346 0.136 0.342
Women 0.310 0.462 0.358 0.480
a) Work experience during last 15 years
Before-policy sample After-policy sample
Table 1:
Descriptive statistics
dependent variable: unemployment unemployment 
outflow inflow







Age Spline 40 -0.003 -0.003
(0.22) (0.64)
Age Spline 50 0.047 0.000
(7.13)** (0.07)
After policy -0.046 -0.014
(1.51) (1.03)
1st quarter 0.513 0.159
(28.97)** (16.32)**
3rd quarter -0.109 0.154
(5.34)** (16.17)**




Experiencea (in years) -0.015 -0.128
(3.27)** (67.96)**
Tenure (years) -0.028 -0.056
(20.68)** (91.88)**












Probit results on unemployment flows
Note: Probit coefficients (not marginal effects), absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
a) Work experience during last 15 years
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
ELIG52 -0.176 -0.193 -0.180
(4.75)** (4.80)** (4.48)**
ELIG39 -0.035 -0.041 -0.035
(1.04) (1.12) (0.95)
ELIG52 0.137 0.143 0.135
(8.36)** (8.01)** (7.53)**







Calendar time dummys (for each quarter)
Note: Probit coefficients (not marginal effects), absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Age dummys (for each year) 
PBD-coefficients: Allowing for more flexible effects of age and calendar time
ELIG 52 ELIG 39 ELIG 52 ELIG 39
Whole sample -0.183 -0.035 0.143 0.054
(4.96)** (1.04) (8.77)** (3.78)**
Women -0.248 -0.019 0.164 0.003
(3.84)** (0.32) (5.61)** (0.10)
Men 0.000 0.079 0.120 0.089
(0.00) (1.96) (5.87)** (4.97)**
Blue collar -0.146 -0.028 0.139 0.071
(2.68)** (0.58) (5.99)** (3.51)**
White collar -0.005 0.083 0.212 0.078
(0.07) (1.46) (7.65)** (3.17)**
Low wage -0.160 0.032 0.145 0.022
(3.39)** (0.74) (6.60)** (1.14)
High wage -0.052 -0.002 0.138 0.063
(0.97) (0.05) (5.95)** (3.10)**
Low tenure -0.123 0.003 0.100 0.042
(3.02)** (0.08) (5.27)** (2.62)**
High tenure -0.160 0.009 0.157 0.052
(1.94) (0.11) (4.92)** (1.75)
Seasonal -0.073 0.086 0.022 -0.038
(1.06) (1.40) -0.7000 (1.38)
Non-seasonal -0.091 0.041 0.192 0.087
(2.11)* (1.05) (9.84)** (5.01)**
Note: Probit coefficients (not marginal effects), absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4:
Diff-in-diff Probit coefficient of PBD-effects: various subgroups
unemployment outflow unemployment inflow
Quarterly Quarterly Interaction Implied steady-sate 
outflow inflow unemployment ratio
(%)
Before policy-change .5369 .0157 2.84
After policy-change .4768 .0209 4.20
Implied increase in u* (p.p.) .35 .91 .11 1.37
(percentage due to ...) (25.5%) (66.7%) (7.9%) (100.0%)
Implied increase in u* per
additional PBD week (p.p.)
Before policy-change .5809 .0161 2.70
After policy-change .5695 .0180 3.07
Implied increase in u* (p.p.) .05 .31 .01 .37
(percentage due to ...) (13.5%) (83.8%) (2.7%) (100.0%)
Implied increase in u*
per additional PBD week
Table 5: 
.005 .034 .001 .041
.016
Effects of PBD increase in inflow, outflow and unemployment population ratio
.062
PBD change 30 to 39 weeks
PBD change 30 to 52 weeks
.005.041
u change in u
absolut % absolut % absolut %
full sample .0284 .0137 .0035 25.4% .0091 66.8% .0011 7.8%
females .0305 .0231 .0073 31.8% .0128 55.6% .0029 12.6%
males .0268 .0066 .0000 0.0% .0066 100.0% .0000 0.0%
blue collar .0286 .0127 .0027 20.9% .0092 72.6% .0008 6.5%
white collar .0195 .0133 .0001 0.7% .0131 98.9% .0001 0.5%
low wage .0418 .0178 .0041 23.0% .0126 70.5% .0012 6.5%
high wage .0204 .0077 .0007 8.9% .0068 88.2% .0002 2.9%
low  tenure .0506 .0134 .0033 24.2% .0096 71.5% .0006 4.3%
high tenure .0153 .0116 .0027 23.1% .0076 65.8% .0013 11.2%
seasonal industries .0668 .0036 .0015 42.7% .0020 56.1% .0000 1.2%
other industries .0220 .0147 .0018 12.0% .0120 81.7% .0009 6.3%
full sample .0270 .0037 .0005 14.2% .0031 84.2% .0001 1.6%
females .0269 .0005 .0004 69.6% .0002 30.0% .0000 0.4%
males .0263 .0037 -.0009 -25.1% .0047 129.5% -.0002 -4.4%
blue collar .0287 .0049 .0004 8.2% .0044 90.6% .0001 1.2%
white collar .0182 .0024 -.0013 -52.6% .0039 163.6% -.0003 -11.0%
low wage .0408 .0011 -.0007 -61.2% .0018 163.7% .0000 -2.5%
high wage .0193 .0028 .0000 0.8% .0028 99.0% .0000 0.1%
low  tenure .0452 .0036 -.0001 -1.8% .0036 102.0% .0000 -0.1%
high tenure .0118 .0017 -.0001 -5.5% .0018 106.3% .0000 -0.8%
seasonal industries .0689 -.0050 -.0016 31.8% -.0035 69.7% .0001 -1.5%
other industries .0209 .0039 -.0006 -15.6% .0046 119.0% -.0001 -3.4%
due to  interaction
Table 6: 
Decomposing the increase in the unemployment population ratio, various subsamples
BPD 30 to 39
BPD 30 to 52
due to outflow due to inflow Subsample
